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CONSTRAINTS AND MARR’S LEVELS 2
Abstract
Blokpoel reminds us of the importance of consistency of function across Marr’s levels, but we argue that
the approach to ensuring consistency that he advocates — a strict relation through exact implementation of
the higher-level function at the lower level — is unnecessarily restrictive. We show that it forces
over-complication of the computational level (by requiring it to incorporate concerns from lower-levels)
and results in the sacriﬁce of the distinct responsibilities associated with each level. We propose an
alternative, no less rigorous, potential characterisation of the relation between levels.
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CONSTRAINTS AND MARR’S LEVELS 3
On the relation between Marr’s levels: A response to Blokpoel (2017)
Introduction
Blokpoel’s attempt to constrain relationships between Marr’s levels is to be welcomed. As Blokpoel
notes, if one assumes only a loose relation between each of Marr’s three levels then consistency between
levels (however that might be deﬁned) cannot be ensured. Blockpoel proposes a two-pronged approach to
the problem of constraining relations between levels. First, he calls for a strict relation between successive
levels, whereby each “subordinate level is an exact implementation of the higher level” (p. 3), and second
he advocates the use of computational-level constraints on inputs (i.e., constraints at the top-most,
computational, level) as a way of placing limits on lower-level accounts.
The Primary Difﬁculty for Strict Relations
While we support Blokpoel’s goal, his call for a strict relation between successive levels seems to us
to be unnecessarily restrictive. It fails to acknowledge that different levels are subject to qualitatively
different types of constraint and in so doing it forces higher-level descriptions to incorporate consequences
that derive from lower-level considerations (and arguably vice versa).
Consider the example of (well-deﬁned) goal-directed problem solving. An informal
computational-level theory based on the work of Newell and Simon (1972) might claim this requires
ﬁnding a path through state-space from the initial state to a goal state by applying a sequence of operators
(i.e., state transition functions). More formally, the problem may be characterised in the language of
Blokpoel, Kwisthout, van der Weide, Wareham, and van Rooij (2013) as follows:
Input: ⟨S, s0, E, g⟩, where S is a set of states, s0 ∈ S is the start state, E ⊂ [S × S] is the set
of edges between states, reﬂecting valid state transitions, and g : S → [0, 1] is a function that
maps states to 1 if and only if they satisfy the goal (and 0 otherwise).
Output: p ∈ S+, where p1, the ﬁrst element of p, is s0, each successive pair of elements in the
path p is in E (i.e., ⟨pi−1, pi⟩ ∈ E for 0 < i ≤ n, where n is the length of the path p), and pn
(the last element of p) is a goal state (i.e., g(pn) = 1).
This computational-level characterisation is intentionally minimal and one might argue for additional
constraints on p (e.g., that it contains no loops or that it is a shortest path, etc.). One might even argue that
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CONSTRAINTS AND MARR’S LEVELS 4
the characterisation should specify output(s) for each potential input (as Blokpoel appears to suggest).
Critically, however, even with such constraints, the computational level account makes no reference to
algorithmic concepts (i.e., to concepts related to speciﬁc algorithms that might meet the computational
requirement).
Consider now an algorithmic-level model of goal-directed problem solving that meets the
computational-level speciﬁcation. Algorithmic-level accounts typically incorporate some form of limited
look-ahead, whereby participants are argued to imagine the consequences of different sequences of two or
three possible moves, attach a valuation of the subsequent states, and choose the moves with the greatest
valuation. This can be repeated until a goal state is achieved. More information is required to ﬂesh out this
sketch into a speciﬁc algorithm. Minimally we require a valuation function v : S → R that maps states to
values, and which is maximised for goal states, together with a look-ahead parameter (typically denoted k)
that speciﬁes the depth of look-ahead. While one can imagine different algorithmic-level models based on
different value functions (v), the look-ahead parameter (k) reﬂects a resource constraint — a limitation on
the algorithm imposed either by the human cognitive aparatus or by the requirement to act in a timely
manner.
Consider now a speciﬁc problem, say one that requires at least d steps for its solution. For values of
k less than d there is no guarantee that the algorithmic-level account will concur with the
computational-level account, but for all solvable problems (i.e., all problems that can be solved in a ﬁnite
number of moves), regardless of the value function, the output of the algorithmic account will match the
computational-level for a sufﬁciently large value of k.
Our example is somewhat different from the example cited by Blokpoel. He discusses Bayesian
Inverse Planning (BIP) as an account of how one might infer an agent’s goals from its actions (and
knowledge of the probabilistic relations between actions and goals). In the case of BIP, the argument (from
tractability considerations) is that for the theory to be psychologically plausible one of two constraints must
hold. These constraints concern the number of goals that must be considered, the maximum number of
“values” for those goals (e.g., within the BIP framework a goal such as satisfy hunger might have three
values: big-hunger, medium-hunger or little-hunger), and the probabilities of different combinations of
goals. In this case the constraints relate to the environment within which BIP is tractable. But presumably
even with a suitably constrained environment, different algorithms may introduce different resource
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CONSTRAINTS AND MARR’S LEVELS 5
constraints such that the algorithm will only approximate the computational-level BIP theory.
Alternatively, the limits on the number of goals etc. required for BIP to be tractable may be imposed by
architectural limitations (e.g., working memory capacity limitations), which ﬂow from lower-level
considerations (and not the computational level).
An Alternative Proposal
Given the above arguments, we propose an alternative account (to that of Blokpoel, 2017)
concerning the relationship between levels. In order to ensure consistency between levels, Blokpoel
proposes:
A(i) = C(i)
for all inputs i within the cognitive capacity’s domain, where C is a computational-level theory and A is a
corresponding algorithmic-level theory. We propose instead the following relation between the algorithmic
and computational levels:
lim
r→∞Ar(i) = C(i)
for all valid inputs i, where r denotes the resources of the speciﬁc algorithm Ar which implements (in the
sense of Blokpoel) C, the target computational-level theory. Critically, in this alternative formulation r
concerns the algorithmic level and does not feature in the computational-level theory.1
In formal terms, it is of course possible to fold r into the computational level so as to preserve the
position of Blokpoel (2017), viz.:
A(i, r) = C(i, r)
However, this formulation adds unnecessary complication to the computational-level speciﬁcation — one
must consider resources and their availability as a further input to the computational level. Perhaps more
critically it locates r at the wrong level as r is a property of a speciﬁc algorithm. Different algorithms may
use qualitatively different resources, and pushing the resource into the computational level means that the
computational-level description is no longer algorithm independent.
These concerns are magniﬁed if one adopts the logical extension of Blokpoel’s approach to the
implementation level. Here one would be required to fold neural constraints into both the algorithmic and
1We assume a similar formulation of the relation between the algorithmic and representational level and the implementation
level.
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CONSTRAINTS AND MARR’S LEVELS 6
representational level and then into the computational level. Doing so loses one of the main reasons for
distinguishing between levels in the ﬁrst place — namely that one can work at one level without being
overly concerned by lower (and higher) level constraints.
An Additional Concern
A subsidiary argument made by Blokpoel (2017) is that “each computational-level constraint limits
the set of possible algorithms” (p. 8). While this may well be true of some computational-level constraints,
it is not true of all computational-level constraints. The tractability constraint is a case in point. As van
Rooij (2008) notes, some researchers have dismissed various computational-level theories on the grounds
that they are intractable, meaning that there is provably no known algorithm that can compute the output of
the computational-level theory in a reasonable time (where “reasonable” time is deﬁned as a polynomial
function of some complexity parameter of the input, such as the input’s length). van Rooij further argues
that this dismissal is unjustiﬁed if the speciﬁc inputs which require unreasonable time are not typically
encountered. In other words, van Rooij’s argument is that restricting inputs effectively renders tractable
some computational-level theories that would otherwise be intractable. This is a position that we, and
Blokpoel (2017) endorse. However, restricting inputs typically increases the space of potential algorithms
because algorithms that might be unreasonable on the full set of inputs may be reasonable when the set of
inputs is restricted. Consequently, it is not the case that computational-level constraints necessarily limit
the set of possible algorithms.
Conclusion
We have argued that the relation between the computational and algorithmic levels proposed by
Blokpoel (2017) is idealistic. It may hold in the limit as resource (and other algorithmic-level) constraints
are relaxed, but demanding that it hold independently of algorithmic-level constraints does not fully
appreciate the purpose of distinguishing between levels. In our view, the root of the difﬁculty arises from
Blokpoel’s assertion that “the competence/performance distinction [is] orthogonal to Marr’s levels of
analysis” (Blokpoel, 2017, p. 2). While the distinction is not without its own difﬁculties (e.g., in identifying
competence based purely on performance), Marr (1982) explicitly identiﬁed the competence theory of
Chomsky (1965) as a computational-level theory, contrasting it with an algorithmic-level performance
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
CONSTRAINTS AND MARR’S LEVELS 7
theory.
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